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ADMINISTERING SUSPECT CLASSES
BERTRALL L. ROSS II†
ABSTRACT
It has been over forty years since the Supreme Court declared a class
suspect under the Equal Protection Clause. In that time, the Court has
denied suspect-class status—and the special judicial protections
associated with it—to the elderly, the disabled, and the poor, and it has
avoided suspect-class determinations when addressing laws that
discriminate against members of the LGBTQ community.
Administrative agencies, however, have stepped in to provide
marginalized groups with some protections through their interpretation
of civil rights laws. The Court has shown hostility to those agency
interpretations, often in opaque decisions that seem to rest on principles
of judicial supremacy as much as substantive constitutional principles.
This Article argues that the Court’s hostility to agencies’ role in this
area is misguided. Courts should defer to administrative agencies when
they protect suspect classes on the basis of reasonable interpretations of
civil rights statutes. The principle of judicial supremacy is not relevant:
the Court’s abandonment of suspect classes appears driven by the
Justices’ concern that the judiciary is intervening too much into the
political process rather than a genuine belief that the groups in question
do not qualify for suspect status. Given that this court-centered
institutional concern does not apply to agencies, it is entirely
appropriate for administrative officials to step in to fill the gap in
protecting vulnerable minorities. Further, agencies are better
positioned than other institutions to calibrate the protection of groups
according to the societal context and the need for intervention.

Copyright © 2017 Bertrall L. Ross II.
† Professor of Law, UC Berkeley School of Law. For their extremely helpful comments,
edits, and suggestions, I would like to thank Sam Bagenstos, Chai Feldblum, Nina Mendelson,
Gillian Metzger, Joy Milligan, Eloise Pasachoff, participants at the Duke Law Journal’s 47th
Annual Administrative Law Symposium, and the editors of the Duke Law Journal.

ROSS IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1808

5/8/2017 1:50 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 66:1807

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction .......................................................................................... 1808
I. The Institutionalist Explanation for the Judicial Abandonment
of Suspect Classes ...................................................................... 1814
A. Judicial Protection of Suspect Classes ............................. 1818
B. Judicial Anxiety About Protecting Suspect Classes ....... 1821
C. Judicial Confinement of Suspect-Class Doctrine ........... 1823
II. The Institutional Case for an Administrative Agency Role in
Protecting Suspect Classes ....................................................... 1829
A. The Limits of Civil Rights Statutes .................................. 1830
B. The Benefits of Protecting Suspect Classes Through
Administrative Action ....................................................... 1832
C. The Drawbacks of Protecting Suspect Classes Through
Administrative Action ....................................................... 1837
III. The Constitutional Case for an Administrative Agency Role in
Protecting Suspect Classes ....................................................... 1839
Conclusion ............................................................................................. 1845
INTRODUCTION
In September 2016, the U.S. Department of Education released a
proposed regulation to enforce the 2015 amendments to the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA).1 The
ESEA—one of the legislative crown jewels of the 1960s’ War on
Poverty—was designed to “provide all children significant opportunity
to achieve a fair, equitable, and high-quality education, and to close
educational achievement gaps.”2 The principal vehicle for achieving
this purpose was Title I of the ESEA, which provided supplemental
funds to states and localities to cover the educational needs of the
economically disadvantaged.3
From the beginning, there was evidence that states used Title I
funds to supplant state funds that would have gone to high-poverty
schools in any case, defeating the ESEA’s goal of increasing the overall

1. Title I–Improving the Academic Achievement of the Disadvantaged–Supplement Not
Supplant, 81 Fed. Reg. 61,148 (Sept. 6, 2016) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 200); see Every
Student Succeeds Act, Pub. L. No. 144-95, 129 Stat. 1802 (2015) (amending and re-authorizing
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301–7981 (2012 & Supp. 2016)).
2. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 § 1001, 20 U.S.C. § 6301.
3. Id. tit. I §§ 1001–1605 (encompassing Title I of the ESEA).
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resources available to schools educating large numbers of poor
children.4 An amendment to the ESEA in 1970 prohibited states from
supplanting these funds,5 but it did little to stop the practice because it
was weakly enforced. By 2016, states and localities had shortchanged
3.3 million schoolchildren, located in 5,750 high-poverty schools, an
average of $440,000 per year and over $2 billion total since the law’s
enactment.6
President Barack Obama’s Secretary of Education, John King,
decided to take action to ensure that the law would be followed by
proposing a new regulation to implement Title I.7 King—an orphan
who attended New York City Public School 276 in Brooklyn’s workingclass Canarsie neighborhood—announced, “For too long, the students
who need the most have gotten the least.”8 He continued, “The
inequities in state and local funding that we see between schools within
districts are inconsistent not only with the words ‘supplement-notsupplant’ but with the civil rights history of [Title I of the ESEA].”9
King’s proposed regulation would have redressed funding inequities by
ensuring that poor children in high-poverty schools received $2 billion
in additional funding.10 States would have been required to “use a
methodology to allocate state and local funds . . . that ensure[s] each
[Title I] school receives all the state and local funds it would otherwise
receive if it were not a Title I school.”11 The Department of Education
encouraged states to achieve compliance by increasing schools’ overall
funding rather than shifting resources from more affluent to less
affluent schools.12

4. See generally WASH. RESEARCH PROJECT & NAACP LEGAL DEF. FUND, TITLE I OF
ESEA: IS IT HELPING POOR CHILDREN? (1969) (identifying several instances of states and
localities misusing Title I funds).
5. Act of Apr. 13, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-230, § 109, 84 Stat. 121, 124.
6. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Fact Sheet: Supplement-Not-Supplant Under Title I
of the Every Student Succeeds Act (Aug. 31, 2016), http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/factsheet-supplement-not-supplant-under-title-i-every-student-succeeds-act [https://perma.cc/LGH4
-WDRV] [hereinafter Fact Sheet].
7. Title I–Improving the Academic Achievement of the Disadvantaged–Supplement Not
Supplant, 81 Fed. Reg. 61,148 (Sept. 6, 2016) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 200).
8. Fact Sheet, supra note 6; see Education Secretary Says Status Quo in Schools Is
Unacceptable, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 3, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/09/03/492549553/
education-secretary-says-status-quo-in-schools-is-unacceptable [https://perma.cc/EJ35-P6U9].
9. Fact Sheet, supra note 6
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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Although its immediate goal was to combat the state practice of
using Title I funds to supplant state funding, the proposed regulation
would have also forced states to provide greater equity in their funding
of schools with high concentrations of poverty.13 In this respect, the
proposed regulation represented a striking departure from a
longstanding Supreme Court interpretation of the Constitution that
postdates the ESEA and the amendment prohibiting state supplanting
of Title I funds. In San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez,14 the Court concluded that states could use property taxes
to fund schools unequally—a practice which primarily disadvantages
poor children—and still comply with the Equal Protection Clause of
the Constitution because education is not a fundamental right.15 In a
subsequent case, the Court went further and held that the poor are not
a suspect class entitled to special judicial protection from the
democratic process.16
According to the Rodriguez Court’s interpretation of the
Constitution, states have no obligation to protect the poor by
equalizing educational funding across schools. But under the proposed
Department of Education regulation, states would have had to protect
the poor through equalized educational funding to maintain access to
13. See id. (announcing “full equity in funding between schools, districts and states” as a goal
for federal education policy).
14. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
15. See id. at 54–55 (noting that while Texas’s use of property taxes had “result[ed] in
unequal expenditures between children who happen[ed] to reside in different districts,” the
system was not “so irrational as to be invidiously discriminatory” and thus unconstitutional).
16. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (“[T]his Court has held repeatedly that
poverty, standing alone, is not a suspect classification.”). The Court in Rodriguez did not hold
that the poor were not a suspect class. Instead, it simply determined that there was no “evidence
that the financing system discriminates against any definable category of ‘poor’ people.” Id. at 25.
Rather, the alleged discrimination of the financing system was against “a large, diverse, and
amorphous class, unified only by the common factor of residence in districts that happen to have
less taxable wealth than other districts.” Id. at 28. It was this class that had “none of the traditional
indicia of suspectness.” Id. Yet despite leaving the question of the suspect-class status open, the
Court subsequently relied on Rodriguez for support in denying suspect-class status to the poor.
See Bertrall L. Ross II & Su Li, Measuring Political Power: Suspect Class Determinations and the
Poor, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 342–43 (2016) (describing the process by which the Court engaged
in a denial of suspect-class status to the poor). Before Rodriguez, both the Court and
administrative agencies protected the poor through heightened scrutiny of state laws that
discriminated against them. See id. at 341–42 (describing a period in the 1960s and 1970s when the
Court appeared to treat the poor as a suspect class); Karen M. Tani, Administrative Equal
Protection: Federalism, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Rights of the Poor, 100 CORNELL L.
REV. 825, 845–51 (2015) (describing a Social Security Board lawyer’s interpretation of the Social
Security Act as providing more rigorous protection for the poor than the Court had mandated
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause).
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critical federal funds for schools.17 In effect, the agency sought to
impose a form of heightened protection for the poor by using its
discretion to interpret the relevant federal funding statutes. The
Department of Education’s proposed supplement-not-supplant
regulation thus introduced a tension between a judicial interpretation
of the Constitution that denies special protection to the poor and an
administrative interpretation of a civil rights statute that grants such
protection. But such tension is not new. Conflicts of this sort have been
an important part of the legal landscape for at least the past halfcentury.
In the 1970s, the Court began to consistently deny groups’ claims
for special protection from the democratic process.18 Since then, the
Court has, in addition to the poor, denied suspect-class status to
pregnant women, the elderly, and the disabled while leaving the status
of the LGBTQ community in limbo.19 The Court has subjected laws
that classify on the basis of race or gender to heightened scrutiny, but
the Court has explained that this is not because the laws
discriminatorily harm a subordinated racial or gender class.20 Rather,
the Court has determined that racial and gender classifications are
subject to more rigorous scrutiny because it is presumptively
inappropriate for governments to use these criteria as overt bases for
decisionmaking.21 Since the 1970s, the Court—when it has reviewed the

17. Derek W. Black, The Congressional Failure to Enforce Equal Protection Through the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 313, 314 (2010).
18. For further discussion of the Court’s denial of different groups’ claims of special
protection, see infra Part I.
19. For more information on the denial of special protection to these groups, see infra Part
I. The Court has applied rational basis review more rigorously to certain laws that discriminate
against the disabled and members of the LGBTQ community. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 631–35 (1996) (applying rigorous rational basis review to a law discriminating against gays
and lesbians); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442–50 (1985) (applying
rigorous rational basis review to a law discriminating against the disabled); see also Miranda
Oshige McGowan, Lifting the Veil on Rigorous Rational Basis Scrutiny, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 377,
382 (2012) (identifying other cases in which the Court has applied rigorous rational basis review).
But the Court continues to view rational basis review as the default form of review for classes that
the Court does not consider suspect.
20. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (embracing an
anticlassification framework in which “all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal,
state, or local government actor [are to be] analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny”);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197–98 (1976) (applying the anticlassification framework to gender
classifications through a holding subjecting “statutory classifications that distinguish between
males and females” to intermediate scrutiny).
21. For further discussion of the Court’s decision that race and gender classifications are
subject to a more rigorous scrutiny, see infra Part I.C.
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constitutionality of facially neutral laws that disparately harm members
of historically subordinated classes, such as African Americans or
women—has applied a deferential rational basis review unless the
plaintiffs have proven that the law was motivated by a discriminatory
purpose and thus functions as a de facto classification.22
Even though the Court has refused to protect subordinated
groups, such groups have not remained entirely unprotected from
discriminatory state actions; federal agencies have stepped in by
interpreting civil rights statutes to provide protections to certain
groups. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)—
which is responsible for interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,23
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),24 and the
employment sections of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA)25—has been perhaps the most assertive in exercising this
administrative authority.26 Even though the Court has denied
protections against workplace practices that inflict unjustified
disproportionate harm on pregnant women, African Americans, and
elderly individuals, the EEOC has enforced regulations interpreting
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the ADEA to provide protections
against such practices.27
The EEOC has not acted alone. Some other agencies have done
the same, including the former Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare in its interpretation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act; the
Department of Housing and Urban Development in its interpretation
of the Fair Housing Act; multiple agencies in their interpretations of
the ADA; and the Department of Education in its proposed
22. Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (upholding a law that had a disparate
impact on women because the challenger to the law had not shown that the legislature adopted
the law “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group”);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1977) (rejecting racial disparate impact as the sole basis
for invalidating a law or subjecting it to close scrutiny). For further discussion of the Court’s
review of facially neutral laws that harm historically subordinated classes, see infra Part I.C.
23. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701–716, 78 Stat. 241, 253–66 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012)).
24. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012)).
25. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, §§ 101–108, 104 Stat. 327,
330–37 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117 (2012)).
26. Laws Enforced by the EEOC, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.
eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/index.cfm [https://perma.cc/Q3KJ-4H4Y] (listing Title VII, the ADEA,
and sections of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) as laws enforced by the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)).
27. See infra text accompanying notes 134–39.
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regulations interpreting the ESEA.28 In each instance, the agencies
acted to enforce statutes in ways that diverged from the Court’s
interpretations of the Constitution.
These tensions between judicial interpretations of the
Constitution and administrative interpretations of statutes raise two
important questions. First, is it constitutionally legitimate for agencies
to interpret ambiguous statutes to protect classes for whom the Court
has denied special protection in its constitutional jurisprudence?
Second, is it democratically desirable for agencies to provide such
protection?
In this Article, I argue that it is constitutionally legitimate for
agencies to interpret statutes in a way that provides historically
marginalized groups with protections that the Supreme Court has
denied them. In Part I, I argue that the Court’s frequent denials of
suspect-class status appear to have been driven by the majority’s
concerns about extending special protection to too many groups, which
might lead courts to intervene too often in the political process.29 The
majority’s concern about excessive intervention in the democratic
process is the only rational explanation for its otherwise
unsubstantiated determinations that subordinated groups claiming
entitlements to suspect-class status are able to defend their interests
through the political process.30 If judicial abandonment of suspect
classes has been motivated by concerns about the Court’s institutional
role rather than determinations about what the Constitution
substantively requires, then there is no need to wall off agencies from
making different determinations. Instead, administrative agencies
should have the latitude to protect suspect classes through reasonable
interpretations of civil rights statutes.
In Part II, I argue that there are important advantages associated
with agencies taking over this role from the courts. The Supreme Court
has limited itself to making blanket determinations—which are
essentially permanent—based on single cases that all laws
discriminating against a certain class are either presumptively
constitutional or presumptively unconstitutional. The result is a
doctrine that fails to respond to evolving societal contexts by

28. See Discrimination Prohibited, 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b) (2016) (defining prohibited
discrimination in class protective terms).
29. For further discussion of the Court’s concern with protecting too many groups, see infra
Part I.B.
30. For a discussion on the Court’s confinement of suspect-class doctrine, see infra Part I.C.
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permanently denying protection to classes that actually cannot defend
themselves in the political process in at least some contexts and
granting protection to classes that subsequently prove capable of
protecting their own interests through the political process in other
contexts. Mission-driven agencies with expertise on matters impacting
potential suspect classes are better positioned than legislatures to
provide protections to the marginalized, even in the face of opposing
political pressure, and to properly calibrate protections in constantly
evolving social contexts.
In Part III, I argue that administrative interpretations of civil
rights statutes to protect suspect classes are constitutionally legitimate.
The Court’s resistance to deferring to agency interpretations that
protect suspect classes appears to be driven by the principle of judicial
supremacy. According to this principle, the judiciary is supreme in
substantively defining the meaning of the Constitution.31 Agency
interpretations inconsistent with the Court’s constitutional
determinations, therefore, would seem to conflict with judicial
supremacy. But I argue that judicial reliance on this principle to reject
administrative interpretive decisions to protect suspect classes is
misguided because the Court’s abandonment of suspect classes is not
based on a substantive interpretation of the Constitution. Rather, it is
based on an institutional determination that the Court is not best
positioned to protect suspect classes, which should leave space for
other institutions like agencies to fulfill that role.
I. THE INSTITUTIONALIST EXPLANATION FOR THE JUDICIAL
ABANDONMENT OF SUSPECT CLASSES
Many legal scholars claim that the suspect-class doctrine is dead.32
It has been over forty years since the Court recognized a new suspect
class,33 a determination that triggers heightened scrutiny of laws that
discriminate against the class and creates a presumption of
unconstitutionality for those laws.34 During this period, the Supreme
Court has denied or avoided deciding claims of entitlement to suspect31. See infra text accompanying note 157.
32. See, e.g., Suzanne Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 503 (2004)
(pointing to the mid-1970s as the period when the Court stopped expanding the list of
classifications that might be considered suspect or quasi-suspect and linking this abandonment to
“slippery slope-type fears about the potential reach of rigorous review”).
33. Id. at 485.
34. Richard Fallon, Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1315 (2007) (describing
the elements of strict scrutiny).
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class protection by the poor, the elderly, the disabled, and the LGBTQ
community.35 Although the Court continues to closely scrutinize laws
that explicitly or intentionally discriminate against women and racial
minorities, the Justices do not do so because of the harm that
discriminatory state actions might impose on members of the class.36
Instead, the Court has made it clear that it is the nature of the
classification that justifies more rigorous scrutiny for race- and genderbased laws.37 According to the Court, it is presumptively
unconstitutional to classify on the basis of race or gender, regardless of
whom the law affects.38
Although legal scholars both praise and lament the demise of the
suspect-class doctrine, no one has comprehensively examined the
doctrine to identify why the Court abandoned suspect classes.39 An
understanding of why the Court has refused to protect new groups may
help illustrate whether other institutions of government have the
constitutional authority to protect suspect classes. If the Court has
withdrawn from this area based on substantive constitutional
determinations, then other institutions may be unjustified in
intervening. But if the Court has other rationales for retreating from
suspect-class findings, then other government actors might have strong
constitutional grounds for entering this area.
There are at least three potential explanations for the Court’s
abandonment of suspect classes. The first is grounded in a substantive
interpretation of the Constitution of which there are two possibilities.
First, the Court may have embraced an originalist view of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause as only intended to
protect African Americans.40 That interpretation would suggest that no
other groups are entitled to protection under the Equal Protection
Clause. Alternatively, the Court may have embraced Justice John
35. See infra notes 91, 94 and accompanying text.
36. See infra text accompanying note 97.
37. See infra text accompanying note 98.
38. See infra text accompanying note 99
39. The most comprehensive analysis thus far appears to have been written by Professor
Kenji Yoshino, who theorized that the Justices’ anxiety about social pluralism is a reason for the
judicial rejection of equality claims in favor of fundamental rights claims. See generally Kenji
Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747 (2011).
40. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 198–212 (1977); see also The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
36, 81 (1872) (“We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of
discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come
within the purview of [the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment].”).
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Marshall Harlan’s famous assertion in his dissent in Plessy v.
Ferguson41 that the Constitution is colorblind. Adopting this premise
might lead the Justices to shift their substantive focus in applying the
Equal Protection Clause from protecting classes of people to
protecting against the government’s use of inappropriate classifications
(that is, requiring government to be “blind” to such classifications).42
To the extent that the Court’s abandonment of suspect classes was
motivated by either of these substantive interpretations of the
Constitution, a case can be made that other institutions—like
Congress, the President, or administrative agencies—also lack the
constitutional authority to provide special protection to the
subordinated groups excluded from protection.
Another possible explanation for the judicial abandonment of
suspect classes is that the Court believes the classes claiming
entitlement to special judicial protection simply do not need it. A
principal justification for providing certain groups with special judicial
protection is that the groups are too politically weak or marginalized
to defend themselves.43 If the class can defend its interests in the
political process, then the Court should not intervene, even if the class
might lose occasionally or frequently in that process. Only when the
class is a permanent loser should it be entitled to protection from
democratically enacted laws. If the judicial abandonment of suspect
classes has been premised on the belief that no other groups beyond
those already meriting extra scrutiny need such protection, then it
would be similarly hard to justify congressional or executive branch
steps to provide such protections.
A third potential reason for the judicial abandonment of suspect
classes is that the Court has determined that protecting suspect classes
is inconsistent with the judiciary’s institutional role. Since the Lochner
era, the Court has been concerned about the unelected federal
judiciary intervening into the political process.44 Undertaking close
41. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
42. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (asserting famously that “[o]ur Constitution is colorblind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens”).
43. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
135–36 (1980); see also Bertrall L. Ross II, Democracy and Renewed Distrust: Equal Protection
and the Evolving Judicial Conception of Politics, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1565, 1582–90 (2013)
(cataloguing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence protecting the marginalized).
44. See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The
Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383, 1385 (2001) (“Courts that appear to be substituting
their own view of desirable social policy for that of elected officials often are said to Lochnerize.”);
Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 873 (1987) (“The spectre of Lochner
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scrutiny of state laws that discriminate against a particular group may
require a great deal of intervention depending on the group and the
context. A Supreme Court concerned about its institutional legitimacy
might seek to avoid such entanglements. To the extent that this
institutional concern has motivated the judicial abandonment of
suspect classes, that reasoning would not prevent other institutions—
particularly more democratically legitimate ones—from stepping in to
provide protections to subordinated groups.
Because it is impossible to get inside the minds of the Justices, it is
necessary to examine the doctrine to ascertain the most likely
explanation for the Court’s actions. Reviewing the Court’s decisions
suggests that the Justices did not rest their abandonment of suspect
classes on a substantive interpretation of the Constitution—the first
explanation. Although conservative Justices supported a narrow
construction of the Equal Protection Clause as either being limited to
protecting African Americans or confined to formal gender and racial
classifications, those views about the substantive constitutional
meaning of the provision have never gained majority support.45
Instead, a majority of Justices ultimately justified the denial of
suspect-class status to new groups in part on the basis of the second
explanation—that such groups have sufficient political power to
defend themselves in the political process.46 This determination,
however, has been based on an unsubstantiated and undefended
measure of political power that was designed to exclude all groups from
special protection.47 That move to deny all groups protection on the
basis of a reed-thin rationale seems unlikely to be the real reason that
the Court has abandoned suspect classes.
The most likely explanation is a third one: the Court’s concern
about the judiciary’s institutional role. That institutional concern is also
supported by the Court’s doctrine, even though the Court has not
explicitly presented it as a reason to abandon suspect classes. In the
following sections, I detail the development of suspect-class doctrine

has loomed over most important constitutional decisions, whether they uphold or invalidate
governmental practices.”).
45. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 445 (1985) (denying
special protection to the disabled because evidence of past democratic actions favorable to this
group “negate[d] any claim that [the disabled] are politically powerless in the sense that they have
no ability to attract the attention of the lawmakers”).
47. See infra notes 87–93 and accompanying text.
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and elaborate on this institutional explanation for why the judiciary has
refused to identify any additional suspect classes.
A. Judicial Protection of Suspect Classes
The mid-1930s saw the culmination of four decades of close
judicial scrutiny and widespread invalidation of economic and socialwelfare laws. That period, known as the Lochner era, finally produced
a political backlash that threatened the legitimacy and integrity of the
Court.48 In response, the Court famously announced, in the
constitutional settlement of 1938, a new role for itself in enforcing the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.
No longer would the Court scrutinize economic and social-welfare
laws.49 Such a high level of intervention into the political process was
inappropriate for an unelected and unaccountable institution. Instead,
the Court tentatively suggested that it would intervene only when laws
undermined individual rights, obstructed the normal operation of the
political process, or discriminated against discrete and insular
minorities.50
In the years that followed, the Court gradually embraced an
interventionist role in protecting discrete and insular minorities, albeit
in subtle and unsystematic ways. In the cases reviewing state-mandated
discrimination against individuals of Japanese descent during and after
World War II, the Court closely scrutinized the government’s
justification for its use of a racial classification.51 To justify this close
48. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 714 (1985)
(describing the degree to which the Court had been politically discredited in the 1930s due to “its
constitutional defense of laissez-faire capitalism”); Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of
Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 219 (1991) (describing the political reaction to
the Court’s Lochner-era jurisprudence).
49. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 148–52 (1938) (establishing that
economic and social-welfare laws are presumed to be constitutional).
50. Id. at 152–53 n.4 (suggesting that the presumption of constitutionality does not apply to
legislation that infringes on the rights contained in one of the first ten Amendments, “restricts
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable
legislation,” or discriminates against discrete and insular minorities); see also Klarman, supra note
48, at 219 (“The normal presumption of constitutionality to which legislation was entitled possibly
was inappropriate, Justice Stone postulated, not only when specific provisions of the Bill of Rights
were plainly contravened, but also in situations where the ordinary operations of majoritarian
institutions were distorted by artificial constraints on full political participation.”).
51. See, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 646–47 (1948) (scrutinizing and invalidating
California’s Alien Land Law, which discriminated against persons of Japanese descent);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218–24 (1945) (scrutinizing a military internment order
that applied only to persons of Japanese descent but upholding the order because the Court
believed it was necessary to provide the executive some deference during wartime); Hirabayashi
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scrutiny, the Court explained, “[D]istinctions between citizens solely
because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free
people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.”52
In subsequent cases reviewing laws segregating people on the basis of
race, the Court embraced the argument that such racial classifications
were pernicious insofar as they “generate[] a feeling of inferiority”
among those in the subordinated class.53
Soon after, the Court looked beyond race to laws that classified on
the basis of wealth and harmed the poor. In cases addressing challenges
to criminal justice system fees and state poll taxes, the Court
invalidated each of the laws.54 The Court drew an important analogy
between race and wealth classifications and concluded, “Lines drawn
on the basis of wealth or property, like those of race, are traditionally
disfavored.”55 As a result, the imposition of a fee as a condition to
exercising an individual right was found to “cause[] an ‘invidious’
discrimination that runs afoul of the Equal Protection Clause.”56
In these early cases, it remained unclear what aspect of the
challenged government actions concerned the Court. Sometimes, the
Justices alluded to the problems associated with the nature of the
classification: “[D]istinctions between citizens solely because of their
ancestry are by their very nature odious.”57 At other times, such as
when the Court recognized that racial segregation “generates a sense
of inferiority” among African Americans, the Court identified
classifications’ harm to discrete and insular minorities as a cause for
constitutional concern.58 As long as the racial and wealth classifications

v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100–01 (1943) (scrutinizing a wartime curfew order applied only to
persons of Japanese descent but finding it justified because of “the crisis of war and of threatened
invasion”).
52. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100.
53. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
54. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (invalidating a state law that
conditioned the right to vote on the payment of a tax); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356–
58 (1963) (concluding that the failure to provide counsel to an indigent defendant in a criminal
appeal was an “unconstitutional line . . . drawn between rich and poor” because only “the rich
man [could effectuate] a meaningful appeal”); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18–19 (1956)
(invalidating a state law that effectively authorized appellate review only for criminal defendants
who could pay the fee to obtain the required transcript).
55. Harper, 383 U.S. at 668 (citation omitted).
56. Id. (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
57. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100.
58. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494; see also Developments in the Law—Equal Protection, 82 HARV.
L. REV. 1065, 1089–90 (1969) (identifying the shifts in the racial segregation cases from a focus on
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that the Court scrutinized also discriminated against subordinate
classes, it was difficult to determine whether it was the classification
itself or the resulting harm to the subordinate class that motivated the
Justices to apply heightened scrutiny and the presumption of
unconstitutionality.59
In the early 1970s, the Court, for the first time, explicitly subjected
a classification to strict scrutiny because it harmed a subordinated class.
In Graham v. Richardson,60 a case addressing a state law denying
welfare benefits to certain noncitizens, the Court invalidated the law
because “classifications based on alienage, like those based on
nationality or race, are inherently suspect.”61 Quoting the now-famous
footnote from United States v. Carolene Products Co.,62 the Graham
Court explained that the classification was suspect because “[a]liens as
a class are a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minority for
whom such heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.”63 In a later
case, the Court reasoned that non-citizens were discrete and insular
minorities because they could not vote in state and federal elections
and thus could not adequately protect their interests in the political
process.64 The Court, therefore, needed to step in to provide the
protection that noncitizens could not otherwise secure as a group
through the political process.65
Two years after the Court declared noncitizens a suspect class, a
liberal plurality of the Court developed a test for determining which
groups would be entitled to special judicial protection as suspect
classes.66 The liberal plurality determined that women were entitled to
suspect-class status because they had endured a history of

targeting classifications to a focus on close scrutiny on the basis of a colorblind interpretation of
the Constitution to a focus on the effects of laws on racial groups).
59. See Developments in the Law—Equal Protection, supra note 58, at 1107 (“Racial
classifications are generally thought to be ‘suspect’ because throughout the country’s history they
have generally been used to discriminate officially against groups which are politically
subordinate and subject to private prejudice and discrimination.”).
60. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
61. Id. at 371–72 (footnotes omitted); see also Goldberg, supra note 32, at 485 (identifying
the early 1970s as the period in which the Court first started to “articulate detailed indicia for
discerning which classifications should fill” the set of suspect or quasi-suspect classifications).
62. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1971).
63. Graham, 403 U.S. at 372 (quoting Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152–153 n.4).
64. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 641 (1973) (“It is established . . . that an alien is
entitled to the shelter of the Equal Protection Clause.”).
65. Id.
66. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686–88 (1973) (plurality opinion).
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discrimination, shared a characteristic that “frequently b[ore] no
relation to ability to perform or contribute to society,” and lacked the
political power to adequately defend themselves in the democratic
process.67 A fourth factor—the immutability of the shared
characteristic—was also deemed relevant to the plurality’s assessment
of women’s entitlement to suspect-class protection, even though it
appeared to be entirely irrelevant to the Court’s assessment of
noncitizens’ entitlement to such protection.68 The Court eventually
settled on obviousness, distinguishability, or immutability of the shared
characteristic as sufficient to satisfy the fourth factor.69 But just as the
Court provided this systematic approach to guide its role in protecting
suspect classes, the Court quickly abandoned the role altogether.
B. Judicial Anxiety About Protecting Suspect Classes
When the Court first began to provide special protections to
subordinated classes, conservative Justices expressed anxiety about
where this doctrine would lead and questioned how much judicial
intervention it might require. Their anxiety first emerged in the mid1950s when the Court invalidated a state law imposing a fee for
criminal trial transcripts, which were required for an effective appeal,
as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.70 In dissent, Justice John
Marshall Harlan II expressed concern about the reach of the majority’s
assertion that “the Equal Protection Clause imposes on the States an
affirmative duty to lift the handicaps flowing from differences in
economic circumstances.”71 Justice Harlan noted, “[N]o economic
burden attendant upon the exercise of a privilege bears equally upon
all.”72 If the exaction of a fee for transcripts in a felony appeal was
subject to invalidation, then similar fees for a transcript in a
misdemeanor or civil case could be invalid as well.73 Treating the poor

67. Id. at 684–88.
68. See id. at 686 (holding that “since sex . . . is an immutable characteristic . . . the imposition
of special disabilities upon members of a particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate”
the Fourteenth Amendment).
69. See Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (holding that close relatives are not a
suspect class in part because “they do not exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing
characteristics that define them as a discrete group”).
70. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18–19 (1956).
71. Id. at 34 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 35.
73. Id.
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as a suspect class appeared to Harlan to be an exceedingly slippery
slope.
When dissenting in Douglas v. California74 almost a decade later,
Justice Harlan, looking beyond the judicial process, asked whether the
condition of a payment for any government service—such as a payment
of tuition for higher education at a state university, a uniform charge
for water from a municipal corporation, or a uniform sales tax for
goods and services—would also be subject to judicial invalidation.75
Harlan concluded that “[e]very financial exaction [that] the State
impose[d] on a uniform basis [was] more easily satisfied by the well-todo than by the indigent.” Under the majority’s logic, he argued, those
exactions should have been closely scrutinized and subject to
invalidation.76
By the early 1970s, conservative anxiety about the extent of the
Court’s intervention into the political process reached a high point.
Dissenting from the Court’s ruling granting noncitizens suspect-class
status, Justice William Rehnquist took direct aim at the tentative
suggestion in footnote four of Carolene Products that discrete and
insular minorities might be entitled to special judicial protection
requiring the close scrutiny of laws that discriminated against them. He
argued, “The principal purpose of those who drafted and adopted the
[Fourteenth] Amendment was to prohibit the States from invidiously
discriminating by reason of race.”77 The judicial assertion that
Fourteenth Amendment protections could be extended to all discrete
and insular minorities, not simply racial minorities, was, therefore,
inconsistent with the amendment’s original purpose.
Justice Rehnquist also pointed to a potential problem with the
Court deciding which classes were entitled to protection as discrete and
minorities. “Our society,” he noted, “consisting of over 200 million
individuals of multitudinous origins, customs, tongues, beliefs, and
cultures is, to say the least, diverse. It would hardly take extraordinary
ingenuity for a lawyer to find ‘insular and discrete’ minorities at every
turn in the road.”78 In the absence of precise definitions and
constitutional justifications, the decisions extending suspect-class
status “stand for the proposition that the Court can choose a ‘minority’

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
Id. at 361–62 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id.
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 649 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 657.
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it ‘feels’ deserves ‘solicitude’ and thereafter prohibit the States from
classifying that ‘minority’ differently from the ‘majority.’”79
Justice Rehnquist’s originalist argument against extending
Fourteenth Amendment protection beyond racially discriminatory
state actions never received the necessary support from the other
Justices.80 The Court had already gone too far in protecting
marginalized groups against discrimination to revert to such a narrow
construction of the amendment. The Court did, however, respond to
Justice Rehnquist’s worry that arbitrary judgments might lead to the
protection of too many discrete and insular minorities. It did so by both
reframing the classifications reviewed and redefining the standards for
determining a class’s entitlement to suspect-class status.81 Both
provided an avenue for the Court to abandon suspect classes.
C. Judicial Confinement of Suspect-Class Doctrine
The constitutional settlement of Carolene Products contained an
inherent tension between the judicial repudiation of close scrutiny of
economic and social-welfare laws and the Court’s suggestion that close
scrutiny might be appropriate for laws discriminating against discrete
and insular minorities. Depending on how expansively one defines
“economic” and “social welfare” laws, many, or perhaps most, laws
discriminating against discrete and insular minorities would qualify as
economic or social-welfare laws. In the three decades following the
constitutional settlement, the Court addressed this tension by applying
deferential review to economic and social-welfare laws that did not
discriminate against discrete and insular minorities and closely
scrutinizing those laws that did.82
In the early 1970s, however, the Court revisited this resolution. In
its review of a public-welfare program that discriminated against a
group of poor individuals, the Court decided not to scrutinize the
program in the way that it had scrutinized state fees related to criminal

79. Id.; see also J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause,
and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945, 979–81 (1975) (criticizing the
Court for failing to satisfactorily define “the elements of a suspect class”).
80. See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 228–31 (2011) (describing how modern
equal protection jurisprudence is built on the constitutional assumptions of the New Deal and
civil rights revolution rather than the original intent or understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
81. See infra notes 87–93 and accompanying text.
82. See Bertrall L. Ross II, The State as Witness: Windsor, Shelby County, and Judicial
Distrust of the Legislative Record, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2027, 2039–46, 2063–67 (2014).
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proceedings and the poll tax requirement for voting.83 The majority
explained:
For this Court to approve the invalidation of state economic or social
regulation as “overreaching” would be far too reminiscent of an era
when the Court thought the Fourteenth Amendment gave it power to
strike down state laws “because they may be unwise, improvident, or
out of harmony with a particular school of thought.”84

The Court was, of course, referring to the Lochner era of close judicial
scrutiny and widespread invalidation of social and economic
legislation. “That era,” according to the Court, “long ago passed into
history.”85
Rather than closely scrutinize economic and social-welfare laws,
the Court announced that it would only apply a deferential rational
basis review when considering challenges to laws that harmed the poor.
In one case concerning a state law cap on welfare aid, the Court
announced, “In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does
not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the
classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has
some ‘reasonable basis,’ it does not offend the Constitution . . . .”86
Soon after the Court ruled that economic and social-welfare laws
harming the poor would receive rational basis review, the conservative
members of the Court limited the application of the suspect-class
doctrine by redefining the standard for identifying suspect classes.
Specifically, the Court redefined what it meant for a group to be
politically powerless and thus entitled to special judicial protection
from the political process.
Political powerlessness was first defined in Frontiero v.
Richardson,87 the case in which a liberal plurality of the Court
established the suspect-class standard.88 That plurality measured
political power according to whether the group claiming special
protection was descriptively represented in the democratic

83. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (holding that the Court could “find
no basis for applying a different constitutional standard” than traditional rational basis review).
84. Id. at 484 (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955)).
85. Id. at 484–85.
86. Id. at 485 (quoting Lindsley v. Nat. Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)).
87. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
88. Id. at 684–88 (plurality opinion) (concluding that women were a suspect class because
they shared an immutable trait that was not relevant to their ability to contribute or function in
society, suffered a history of discrimination, and lacked political power).
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governmental decision-making bodies.89 In Frontiero, for example, the
absence of women in federal and state executive, legislative, and
judicial offices supported an inference that women suffered from
discrimination and were incapable of defending themselves in the
political process.90
Because of the historical lack of diversity in governing bodies, if
the Court had affirmed this approach of measuring political power
according to descriptive representation, many more groups might have
qualified for special judicial protection. But this metric of political
power would never receive majority support. Instead, a more
conservative majority that emerged soon after Frontiero adopted a
more restrictive measure of political power. In cases denying suspectclass status to the disabled and elderly, the Court determined that those
groups had sufficient power to attract the attention of lawmakers
because they had benefited from favorable democratic actions in the
past, including laws and executive actions protecting their group
members from discrimination.91
The implication of this judicial interpretation of political
powerlessness is clear. For nearly every group, the Court can point to
past favorable democratic actions as evidence of a group’s political
power. The error arising from this definition of political power is also
clear: democratic actions beneficial to a particular group are not
necessarily the product of that group’s exercise of raw political power.92
Instead, they are often the product of legislators’ morality, ideology, or
desire to advance good public policy.93
89. Id. at 686 n.17.
90. The Court took note of the vast underrepresentation of women in politics at the time of
the decision:
There has never been a female President, nor a female member of th[e] Court. Not a
single woman presently sits in the United States Senate, and only 14 women hold seats
in the House of Representatives. . . . [T]his underrepresentation is present throughout
all levels of our State and Federal Government.
Id.
91. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 443–45 (1985) (justifying the
denial of suspect-class status to the disabled because the passage of federal and state laws
favorable to the disabled demonstrated that the group could “attract the attention of the
lawmakers”); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 n.12 (1979) (denying suspect-class status to the
elderly because recent congressional actions favorable to the elderly demonstrated that “the
political system is working”).
92. See Ross & Li, supra note 16, at 367–74 (finding evidence that suggests that democratic
actions favorable to the poor were not the product of the political power of the poor).
93. See, e.g., ROBERT A. BERNSTEIN, ELECTIONS, REPRESENTATION, AND
CONGRESSIONAL VOTING BEHAVIOR: THE MYTH OF CONSTITUENCY CONTROL 104–05 (1989)
(finding empirical support for the role of ideology in legislative decisionmaking); John E. Jackson
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Given the dubious nature of favorable democratic action as a
measure of political power, why did the Court adopt it? After all, the
Court seemed to think that there were other classes entitled to special
protection from the political process—for example, when it applied to
laws that harmed the disabled and LGBTQ members a “rational basis
with bite” standard that proved to be almost as rigorous as strict
scrutiny.94
It seems likely that the Justices were worried about the judiciary’s
appropriate role in reviewing democratic actions. Recall the rationale
that led the Court to reframe laws harming the poor as economic and
social welfare laws entitled to deference—a fear of too much judicial
intervention in the political process. That rationale should also be seen
as the impetus for cases in which the Court redefined political power
and rejected claims of suspect-class status. Although the Court was less
explicit about its fear of returning to the Lochner era when it redefined
political power, it seems probable that the institutional concern was a
dominant one in the minds of the Justices who were in the Court’s
majority. By constructing a standard that made it impossible to extend
heightened judicial protection to any more groups, the Court could
maintain a role of noninterference in the political process, potentially
preserving its institutional legitimacy by avoiding bruising political
battles.
In fact, the Court’s construction of a “rational basis with bite”
standard in place of strict scrutiny can be seen as a response to these
institutional concerns. By sometimes employing stricter scrutiny
disguised as rational basis review, the Justices preserved flexibility to
deny special protection to any group and limit the Court’s intervention
into the political process.
Cases in which the Court has interpreted the Equal Protection
Clause to require proof of discriminatory intent provide further
suggestive evidence of the Court’s motives. Scholars do not generally
associate the judicial development of the discriminatory-intent
& John W. Kingdon, Ideology, Interest Group Scores, and Legislative Votes, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI.
805, 816 (1992) (“[A]ctual legislative voting is driven by a complex mix of factors—ideology, the
motivation to select ‘good’ public policies, a desire for reelection, party loyalty, career
advancement, the pursuit of power within the legislature, and probably several others.”).
94. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–36 (1996) (applying rigorous rational basis review
to a classification that harmed members of the LGBT community and invalidating the
classification); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447, 450 (applying a more rigorous rational basis review to a
classification that harmed the disabled and invalidating the classification); see also McGowan,
supra note 19, at 382 (describing Cleburne and Romer as examples in which the Court has applied
a rigorous rational basis review).
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standard under the Equal Protection Clause with the judicial
abandonment of suspect classes, but, in fact, they are intimately
related. Disparate-impact and suspect-class doctrines have historically
been employed to protect subordinated groups, and they both cohere
with an antisubordination approach to equal protection doctrine.
In the Court’s early review of laws discriminating against the
indigent, the Justices applied a form of disparate-impact analysis.95 The
state imposition of fees for materials and services necessary to a
criminal defense and the required payment of a poll tax to vote had a
harmful impact on the indigent and drove the Court’s invalidation of
the state action.96 Importantly, the Court did not deem the motivation
underlying the disparately harmful state actions to be relevant in either
the criminal justice or the poll tax context.
However, around the same time that the Court abandoned suspect
classes, it also shifted its focus away from closely scrutinizing facially
neutral laws that disparately harmed subordinate groups. In the mid1970s, the disparate impact of a law on women or African Americans
no longer warranted heightened scrutiny and presumptive
invalidation.97 Instead, what triggered close scrutiny was whether the
government had used race or gender as a basis for classification.98
According to this anticlassification framework, a facially neutral law
would only be presumed unconstitutional if the challenger could prove
that the law was motivated by a discriminatory purpose. Under this
new framework, the disparate impact of laws on subordinated classes

95. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357–58 (1963) (explaining that under the
California law at issue, which did not grant the right to counsel on appeal, a “rich man c[ould]
require the court to listen to argument of counsel before deciding on the merits, but a poor man
[could not]”); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (“Destitute defendants must be afforded
as adequate appellate review as defendants who have money enough to buy transcripts.”).
96. See Klarman, supra note 48, at 295 (explaining that the “radical implications” of the
wealth-discrimination cases included the fact that they inverted “the traditional understanding of
equal protection rights [that] acknowledged a constitutional violation only when a particular
group had been deliberately disadvantaged . . . by holding the state responsible for unintended
disparate wealth effects”).
97. See Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (requiring proof that a facially
neutral law was adopted because of, not merely in spite of, its disparate impact on women for it
to be presumed unconstitutional); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (rejecting
evidence of disparate impact as sufficient to presume that a facially neutral law is unconstitutional
even though the plaintiffs alleged that the law unconstitutionally discriminated against African
Americans).
98. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239 (“The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of
race.”).
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was relegated from the leading factor relevant to a law’s presumptive
unconstitutionality to mere evidence of the discriminatory intent
necessary to subject laws to a presumption of unconstitutionality.99
The Court’s justification for its shift from disparate impact to a
discriminatory-intent standard echoed Justices Harlan and Rehnquist’s
institutionalist concerns about the reach of suspect-class doctrine. In
Washington v. Davis,100 which first announced the discriminatoryintent requirement, the Court elaborated on its principal concern with
a disparate-impact standard:
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless
invalid, absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or
burdens one race more than another would be far reaching and would
raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range
of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that
may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than
to the more affluent white.101

In other words, the choice to shield classes from laws that have a
disparate impact on them would force the Court to heavily intervene
into the political process. For the Court and many observers recalling
the Lochner era, such a high level of intervention into the political
process might again threaten the institution’s legitimacy.
*

*

*

In sum, protecting suspect classes is no longer the domain of the
Supreme Court. Instead the Court polices the use of illegitimate
classifications. Laws that discriminate against noncitizens are the only
laws that the Court continues to closely scrutinize because they might
unconstitutionally discriminate against a subordinated class.102 Other
99. See id. at 242 (“Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone
of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. Standing alone, it does not
trigger the rule that racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are
justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations.” (citation omitted)).
100. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
101. Id. at 248.
102. But notably, even in the case of noncitizens, the Court has added several exceptions that
immunize many laws that discriminate against members of the group. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 223 (1982) (“Undocumented aliens cannot be treated as a suspect class because their
presence in this country in violation of federal law is not a ‘constitutional irrelevancy.’”); Foley v.
Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296 (1978) (noting an exception to strict scrutiny when the state
establishes a citizenship qualification “for fulfilling those ‘important nonelective executive,
legislative, and judicial positions,’ held by ‘officers who participate directly in the formulation,
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groups have not been as fortunate. In the 1970s, the Court abandoned
groups, such as the poor and African Americans, that it initially seemed
to protect as discrete and insular minorities. It has also rejected claims
of entitlement to protection against disparately harmful state actions
by women, the disabled, and the elderly. The one group that continues
to make an active claim for suspect-class protection, the LGBT
community, has so far been ignored. And with a conservative majority
controlling the Supreme Court for the foreseeable future, it is unlikely
that their claims will be heeded any time soon.
The Court’s abandonment of suspect classes appears to have been
motivated by concerns about its institutional role. Wary about
excessive intervention into the political process, the Court has
narrowed its role in providing special protection to subordinated
groups. The Court’s justification for refusing to protect subordinated
groups does, however, open the door for other institutions to take on
this role.
II. THE INSTITUTIONAL CASE FOR AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY
ROLE IN PROTECTING SUSPECT CLASSES
Congress is the starting point for any administrative role in
protecting suspect classes. By enacting broadly worded or textually
ambiguous civil rights statutes, Congress delegates the responsibility of
protecting suspect classes to the agencies charged with enforcing those
statutes.103 Sometimes Congress consciously chooses to delegate these
tasks; at other times, demands for political compromise can result in
ambiguous and vague statutory language.104
execution, or review of broad public policy’” (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647
(1973))); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) (applying a deferential standard of review for
discriminatory alienage laws adopted by the federal government because “these matters may
implicate our relations with foreign powers, and . . . must be defined in light of the changing
political and economic circumstances”).
103. This theory underlies the principal standard of judicial deference to agency
interpretations of statutes. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843–44 (1984) (“If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
regulation.”).
104. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality
Disorder: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627,
637–642 (2002) (theorizing that statutory ambiguity facilitates legislative compromise). Implicit
delegations to agencies may also result from Congress’s inability to foresee future circumstances.
See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1175–79 (1993) (identifying
some of the reasons why Congress might not foresee future circumstances, including changes to
the Constitution, society, technology, and judicial interpretations of statutes).
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Invariably, statutory ambiguity and vagueness provide agencies
with multiple choices in their interpretations of statutes. Often officials
interpreting civil rights statutes must choose whether to interpret a
statute to protect subordinated classes or to eliminate improper
classifications and, if the former, how much protection to give to
subordinated classes.
This Part argues that an administrative role in making decisions
and thereby protecting suspect classes is both necessary and desirable.
It is necessary because no other institution has demonstrated the
capacity to step into the breach that the Court left with its
abandonment of suspect classes. It is desirable because administrative
agencies are the institutions best positioned to protect marginalized
groups in ways that are calibrated to need and societal context. The
following discussion advances these points, using past examples of
administrative protection of suspect classes.
A. The Limits of Civil Rights Statutes
In 1966, the EEOC issued a guideline interpreting Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act to prohibit the use of any test that has a discriminatory
impact on a protected class’s employment opportunities unless it is
validated as relevant to the job.105 While the term “protected class” was
broad enough to encompass any racial class, the context of the EEOC’s
interpretation indicated that African Americans and other racial
minorities were the clear focal point for protection due to the groups’
historically subordinated and marginalized status. As the Court
explained when it embraced the EEOC’s interpretation a year later,
the object of Title VII “was to achieve equality of employment
opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to
favor an identifiable group of white employees over other
employees.”106
Although the EEOC interpreted Title VII to protect suspect
classes, the language and legislative history of Title VII itself was more
ambiguous on this point. It defined as unlawful any employment
actions carried out “because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.”107 The use of the phrase “because of” left open

105. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, GUIDELINES ON EMPLOYMENT TESTING
PROCEDURES (1966); see also Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R.
pt. 1607 (2016) (superseding the Guidelines on Employment Testing Procedures).
106. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971).
107. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act states:
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the possibility that Congress intended to prohibit the use of race in
employment decisions rather than protect subordinated classes against
employment actions that have a disparate impact. Another statutory
provision dealing with limits on employers’ use of tests did not provide
any further clarity: it banned employers from giving or acting “upon
the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that
such test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed,
intended, or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex
or national origin.”108
Title VII’s vagueness and ambiguity were not unique. Divisions in
Congress necessitated legislative compromises that resulted in civil
rights statutes that were often vague and ambiguous. For example,
contained in nearly every civil rights statute is a broadly worded
prohibition on discrimination. Using a variety of phrases and terms,
these civil rights statutes prohibit actors from discriminating on the
basis of a protected status.109 While assertions of purpose and intent in
the legislative history sometimes indicate a statutory orientation
toward prohibiting either the use of a classification or a disparate harm
to a protected class, the statutory language itself allows for different
interpretations.
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
108. Id. § 2000e-2(h).
109. For example, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act states that “[n]o person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.” Id. § 2000d. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) prohibits any covered
jurisdiction from adopting a voting change “that has the purpose of or will have the effect of
diminishing the ability of any citizen[] . . . on account of race or color . . . to elect their preferred
candidates of choice.” Id. § 1973c(a)–(b). The ADEA makes it unlawful for employers,
employment agencies, and labor organizations “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of [an] individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(a)(1) (2012). The ADA states that “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified
individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).

ROSS IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1832

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

5/8/2017 1:50 PM

[Vol. 66:1807

Statutory ambiguities arising from compromises are compounded
by ambiguities arising from the inability of Congress to foresee
circumstances to which the statute might apply in the future. As a result
of these sources of statutory ambiguity, the primary implementers of
statutes—administrative agencies—have a large role in interpreting
them. In this role, mission-driven agencies, which are typically
designed to be responsive to members of the civil rights community,
have interpreted civil rights statutes to protect marginalized classes
from discrimination by state and private actors.
B. The Benefits of Protecting Suspect Classes Through
Administrative Action
Civil rights statutes not only establish substantive prohibitions on
discrimination, but also typically delegate enforcement authority to an
agency. From this delegation, a new or preexisting agency develops a
mission and employs personnel focused on advancing the statute’s
objectives.110 The mission and personnel of the various civil rights
agencies have typically been oriented toward protecting classes from
discrimination, rather than protecting against the government uses of
classifications.111 In carrying out this mission, civil rights agencies have
often developed interwoven relationships with civil rights groups that
seek to advance the interests of subordinated minorities. Such
relationships are facilitated through design features that make certain
groups the principal constituents of the agency.112 Further, procedures
such as notice-and-comment rulemaking bring the viewpoints of
interested groups into agency decisionmaking.113
As an example, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) delegated
to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) the authority to enforce the
central provision of the statute, Section 5, which required that
jurisdictions with a history of voting discrimination obtain approval

110. STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD
REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 93 (2008) (contending that civil servants self-select into agencies
based on their “ideological commitment to a given agency’s mission”).
111. See HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF
NATIONAL POLICY 1960–1972, at 190–93 (1990) (describing the emergence of an EEOC focused
on protecting racial minorities from institutional racism).
112. See Joy Milligan, The Reluctant State: Executive Authority and Civil Rights (Feb. 14,
2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (describing the role of
agency in influencing agency decisionmaking and behavior).
113. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (establishing the procedures for notice-and-comment
rulemaking).
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from the U.S. Attorney General or the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia for any changes to voting qualifications or
procedures.114 In 1968, the DOJ established a Voting Section within its
Civil Rights Division to handle Section 5 enforcement
responsibilities.115 The mission of the Voting Section was to “enforce[]
the civil provisions of the federal laws that protect the right to vote,
including the Voting Rights Act . . . .”116 This mission has tended to
attract personnel motivated to protect voting rights, particularly the
voting rights of historically subordinated minorities who have been the
usual targets of discrimination.117
Moreover, the Voting Section’s mission and enforcement
authority has attracted the attention of civil rights groups seeking to
inform the agency of voting rights violations and to pressure it to
aggressively enforce the VRA to protect minority voting rights.118
Finally, although Congress did not give the DOJ the authority to issue
rules with the force of law, the department has nonetheless proceeded
to issue guidelines interpreting Section 5 through a notice-andcomment process.119 In this notice-and-comment process, civil rights
groups have been active in providing comments on, and offering
alternatives to, proposed guidelines.120
This combination of mission, personnel, design, and procedure has
contributed to a DOJ that has been quite protective of racial minority
voters as a class.121 The Voting Section has advanced antisubordination
interpretations of Section 5 of the VRA that are in tension with judicial

114. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1); id. § 1973c(a).
115. Wan J. Kim, Assistant Att’y Gen. for the Civil Rights Div., The Department of Justice’s
Civil Rights Division: A Historical Perspective as the Division Nears 50 (Mar. 22, 2006),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2008/10/21/historical_perspective.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Y3VZ-LC3U].
116. See Voting Section, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/
crt/voting-section [https://perma.cc/4APT-YVNM].
117. See GRAHAM, supra note 111, at 363 (describing the development of a civil rights
bureaucracy that includes the Voting Section of the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division).
118. Id. (describing the influence of civil rights groups on the agency).
119. See generally, e.g., Revision of Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 Fed. Reg. 486 (Jan. 6, 1987) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 51) (revising
the Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act through the noticeand-comment process).
120. See id. at 486 (identifying twenty-five comments from state or local civic or political
organizations).
121. See generally MAURICE T. CUNNINGHAM, MAXIMIZATION, WHATEVER THE COST:
RACE, REDISTRICTING, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 13–39 (2000) (describing the Voting
Section’s increasingly protective and interventionist role).
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anticlassification interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause.122
Even when the DOJ is operating under Republican presidents opposed
to aggressive protection of minority voting rights, the Voting Section’s
mission, personnel, design, and procedure has provided it with some
insulation from political pressure.123
Administrative agencies like the DOJ often continue to function
as institutions protective of suspect classes long after the ideological
currents and moral pressures have shifted away from protecting those
classes. Agencies continue to play a critical enforcement role many
years after the enactment of the statute. For some civil rights statutes
that delegate enforcement authority to preexisting agencies, there may
not initially be the necessary alignment between mission, personnel,
design, and procedure on the one hand, and the needs and interests of
the marginalized on the other. But the opportunity for the ongoing
exercise of power keeps the door open for agencies to assume the role
of protecting marginalized classes when that necessary alignment
arises, even if it is long after Congress has lost the political will to revisit
the statute and provide protections to suspect classes itself.
The best example of this phenomenon is the one featured at the
beginning of this Article, the Department of Education’s enforcement
of the ESEA.124 The ESEA had been on the books for over fifty years
when the Department of Education proposed regulations to prevent
states from using federal funding to supplant state funding that would
have gone to less affluent schools even without federal funding.125 The
choice to delegate authority to enforce the ESEA to an agency that
preexisted the Act and lacked a mission oriented toward protecting
disadvantaged children, the personnel that would be motivated by such
a mission, or a constituency that cared much about protecting the
disadvantaged, limited the protections provided to school children in

122. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642–44 (1993) (applying anticlassification reasoning as
a basis for closely scrutinizing a state’s drawing of district lines).
123. The DOJ was subject to its greatest threat during the George W. Bush administration
when political pressure led to a dramatic decrease in the enforcement of the VRA. See U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-256T, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: OPPORTUNITIES
EXIST TO STRENGTHEN THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION’S ABILITY TO MANAGE AND REPORT ON
ITS ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS 9–10 (2009). This episode has proven to be an outlier thus far.
124. See supra notes 2–13 and accompanying text.
125. For further discussion of the Department of Education’s decision to propose regulations,
see supra notes 7–13 and accompanying text.
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disadvantaged schools.126 But as Congress shifted its focus away from
using Title I money to support disadvantaged children, the Department
of Education remained in place as a potential vehicle available to
enforce the original purposes of the ESEA.127 And with a shift in
leadership during the Obama administration, the agency assumed this
role through the proposed supplement-not-supplant regulation.128
When agencies assume the role of protecting subordinated classes,
they have an advantage over courts because they can tailor the
protections based upon need and context. This process can be
contrasted with the judiciary’s approach to protecting suspect classes,
which provides little opportunity for flexibility in this respect. Supreme
Court doctrine involves declaring a class suspect at a particular point
in time in response to a specific temporal and factual context.129 Once
the Supreme Court treats a class as suspect, the doctrine of stare decisis
generally requires subsequent courts to adhere to precedent by treating
the class as suspect and scrutinizing laws that discriminate against the
group in other contexts and at other times. It was this broad and static
application of the suspect-class doctrine that likely deterred the Court
from providing special judicial protection to the poor.130
Administrative agencies are not subject to these same constraints.
Rather than being limited to providing the same extensive protection
to an entire class against all laws that discriminate against that class,
agencies can calibrate the level of protections to different groups. For
example, the EEOC has been delegated enforcement authority to
provide protection to racial, national origin, gender, and religious

126. See STEPHEN K. BAILEY & EDITH K. MOSHER, ESEA: THE OFFICE OF EDUCATION
ADMINISTERS A LAW 72–75 (1968) (describing the organization of the Office of Education, a
precursor to the Department of Education, at the time of the enactment of the ESEA).
127. See Black, supra note 17, at 314 (describing how recent versions of Title I of the ESEA
“ha[d] been used to spur general school reform and political agendas more than to further nondiscrimination and equity for poor students”).
128. Former Secretary of Education John King departed from his predecessors by
emphasizing the ESEA’s function as a civil rights law “intended to provide disadvantaged
students with additional resources, over and above what they receive from their local schools.”
Press Release, John B. King Jr., Sec’y of Educ., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Statement on the
Anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education (May 17, 2016), http://www.ed.gov/news/pressreleases/us-secretary-education-john-b-king-jr-statement-anniversary-brown-v-board-education
[https://perma.cc/259Z-2UQJ].
129. For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s suspect-class doctrine, see supra Part I.A.
130. For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s suspect-class doctrine and its application to the
poor, see supra Part I.C.
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classes under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,131 the elderly under the
ADEA,132 and the disabled under the ADA.133 Because of differences
in the statutory bases for the agency’s exercise of enforcement
authority, there is variation in the form of protections provided to these
groups. The EEOC has issued separate guidelines on discrimination
because of sex,134 religion,135 and national origin,136 as well as
regulations implementing the prohibitions on age137 and disability138
discrimination. Although the agency sometimes borrows aspects of
protections from one domain to apply in another, important
distinctions in enforcement standards calibrate protection to the
context in a way that is not possible under the Supreme Court’s equal
protection doctrine.139
Agencies do not have unfettered discretion to decide the form and
level of protection to provide to a class. Instead, they are constrained
by statutory language and a requirement that regulations having the
force of law be subject to deliberative input. The standard set forth in
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.140
requires courts to invalidate administrative interpretations that are
either contrary to the intent underlying the statute or an unreasonable
interpretation of the statute.141 In addition, the standard established in

131. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2012) (granting the EEOC the authority to enforce Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act).
132. See 29 U.S.C. § 628 (2012) (“[T]he Equal Employment Opportunity Commission may
issue such rules and regulations as it may consider necessary or appropriate for [enforcing the
ADEA].”).
133. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (granting the EEOC authority to issue regulations to enforce the
employment title of the ADA).
134. See Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1604 (2016).
135. See Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1605 (2016).
136. See Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1606 (2016).
137. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1625 (2016).
138. See Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 (2016).
139. For example, the EEOC in a series of regulations has addressed varying forms of
employment discrimination on the basis of sex with many of the regulations targeting employment
practices typically harmful to women. See, e.g., Sex as a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification, 29
C.F.R. § 1604.2 (2016); Employment Policies Relating to Pregnancy and Childbirth, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.10 (2016). These regulations are related in some respects to those targeted at protecting
other subordinated classes. See, e.g., Age as Bona Fide Occupational Qualifications, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1625.6 (2016). But they also diverge because of the unique challenges faced by different
subordinated classes.
140. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
141. Id. at 842–43 (establishing the two-step framework for determining when courts should
defer to agency interpretations of statutes).
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Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Auto
Insurance Co.142 requires courts to invalidate administrative
regulations that are the product of procedures not properly responsive
to public comments and suggested alternatives.143 Judicial applications
of these standards prevent agencies from simply providing groups with
maximum protection on the basis of their missions, personnel
preferences, or interest-group pressures. Instead, agencies are limited
to providing the protection allowed by the statute on the basis of a
reasoned justification for such protection.
These judicial limits on administrative discretion are important.
As the Court has abandoned suspect classes, it has relied on a key
assumption: that the democratic process is properly functioning, in that
those classes claiming entitlement to special protection are capable of
defending themselves in the democratic process. Although I question
these assumptions in Part I.C, they do provide a basis for identifying
the proper role for the Court in its review of administrative actions
protecting suspect classes. So long as the protections provided to
suspect classes result from a properly functioning administrative
process, the Court should be as deferential to these administrative
actions as they are to other government actions harming those claiming
entitlement to suspect-class status. And the judicial checks on
administrative actions through Chevron and State Farm provide some
assurance that agencies’ decisions to protect particular groups are in
fact the product of a proper delegation of authority and legitimate
procedures.
C. The Drawbacks of Protecting Suspect Classes Through
Administrative Action
The protection of subordinated classes through administrative
actions is better than no protection at all. But such a shift of authority
from courts to agencies does come with at least two drawbacks.
First, the limited reach of the statutes that agencies are responsible
for enforcing also limits the protection that agencies can provide to
subordinated classes. Although the Department of Education can seek
to equalize educational opportunities for economically disadvantaged

142. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
143. Id. at 43 (requiring an arbitrary and capricious standard under the Administrative
Procedure Act such that “the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory
explanation for its actions including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the
choices made’” (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962))).
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children by requiring that federal funds provided to their schools be
used to supplement the state funds to which the schools are otherwise
entitled, there is no agency that has the statutory authority to provide
protection to indigent individuals subject to jailing for penal debt.144
This problem of too little protection being afforded to subordinated
groups arises from the subordinated classes’ lack of political power to
advance their interests in the political process. For many issues
impacting subordinated groups, there is no fortuitous convergence of
ideology, morality, and social-movement pressure that produces the
political opportunity for congressional action. And when Congress fails
to enact general statutes to protect subordinated classes from
discriminatory state actions, agencies cannot provide that protection
either. This administrative impotency stands in direct contrast with the
power of the Supreme Court to provide protections to subordinated
classes without the delegation or approval of any other institution.145
A second drawback to relying on administrative agencies as the
principal institution protecting suspect classes is agencies’ greater
vulnerability to political pressure. Political pressure can come from
civil rights groups that influence the agency to provide either too much
protection to groups or protection that is inappropriate for the context.
Although courts have checked this form of improper political pressure
by applying Chevron deference and State Farm’s arbitrary-andcapricious standard or by relying on a discretionary determination that
deference is not owed to an administrative interpretation,146 a problem
arises when the political pressure comes from the President, Congress,
or interest groups opposed to protecting the subordinated class. This
type of political pressure can lead to agency inaction, which is not
subject to a judicial check since courts generally cannot force agencies
to act. For example, political pressure from local school boards,
national teachers associations, and state government actors
contributed to the Department of Education’s pre-Obama
administration decision not to protect the state funding entitlements of

144. See Abbye Atkinson, Consumer Bankruptcy, Nondischargeability, and Penal Debt, 70
VAND. L. REV. 917 at 937–938 (2017).
145. For an examination of the Supreme Court’s approach to protecting suspect classes, see
supra Part I.A.
146. These checks can certainly be questioned due to occasionally inappropriate uses, such as
when administrative interpretations are not clearly the product of improper political pressure, but
they are nonetheless available for proper use.
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economically disadvantaged children under the ESEA.147 Yet the
agency’s inaction was never challenged in courts as unreasonable or
arbitrary and capricious.
*

*

*

There are real drawbacks to reliance on agencies as the primary
protectors of historically subordinated and politically marginalized
classes. But given the unwillingness of the courts and the incapacity of
Congress, agencies appear to be the best hope for protecting the classes
that are unable to protect themselves in the political process. The
mission and personnel of agencies responsible for enforcing civil rights
statutes provide built-in strength to the ideological and moral
imperative for protecting suspect classes. This resilient institutional
character is bolstered further by the role of social-justice activists and
lawyers in providing information and putting pressure on agencies to
do more.
The power of agencies in this realm, however, is not unlimited.
They can do no more than provide favorable interpretations of civil
rights statutes, and they are properly constrained by courts’ focus on
ensuring reasonable agency interpretations that are procedurally valid.
But within these constraints, agencies should have the opportunity to
push civil rights statutes to their limits to protect the interests and rights
of subordinated classes. After all, the institutional-legitimacy concerns
that animate the Court’s resistance to protecting suspect classes do not
seem to apply to administrative agencies, which are subject to
democratically elected actors’ oversight.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE FOR AN ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCY ROLE IN PROTECTING SUSPECT CLASSES
Administrative agencies have made statutory interpretive choices
about which classes to protect and how to protect those classes against
the backdrop of the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence abandoning
suspect classes. As the examples in Part II reveal, these choices
sometimes introduce tension between agency interpretations of
statutes and judicial interpretations of the Constitution. Whereas the
Court has been reluctant to provide any protection to subordinated
147. Lorraine M. McDonnell, No Child Left Behind and the Federal Role in Education:
Evolution or Revolution?, 80 PEABODY J. EDUC. 19, 25–28 (2005) (describing the shift from using
Title I to address the particular needs of disadvantaged children to using Title I to aid all children).
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groups beyond noncitizens, administrative agencies have actively
protected racial minorities, women, the elderly, and the disabled on the
basis of broad interpretations of civil rights statutes.
How should the Court approach administrative agencies’
decisions if agencies choose to provide greater protections to groups
via statutory interpretation than the Court has in its constitutional
jurisprudence? The Court has thus far resisted administrative agencies’
interpretations of civil rights statutes that provide greater protections
to classes than the Court has in its constitutional jurisprudence.148
Agency interpretations that would ordinarily be entitled to a high
degree of deference have been overruled or ignored without even a
mention of the relevant deference doctrines.149 Despite the late Justice
Antonin Scalia’s open expression of puzzlement about the failure of
judicial majorities to apply the relevant deference doctrines, the Court
has never justified its denials of deference to agency interpretations of
civil rights statutes.150
What appears to drive this resistance is a separation-of-powers
notion that the judiciary is supreme in its interpretation of the
Constitution. On this view, if agencies interpret statutes that implicate
the Constitution, and these statutory interpretations diverge from
judicial interpretations of the Constitution, judicial supremacy is
undermined. If the Court abandons suspect classes on the basis of a
substantive determination of what the Constitution means, then
judicial supremacy is indeed threatened by conflicting agency
interpretations that provide heightened protections to those suspect
classes. But if, as argued in Part I, the abandonment of suspect classes
arises from the Court’s institutional concerns, then judicial supremacy
is not implicated and the Court should defer to administrative agencies’
reasonable interpretations of civil rights statutes to protect
subordinated groups.
The Court’s jurisprudence limiting congressional exercises of
authority to adopt civil rights statutes pursuant to Section 5 of the

148. See Bertrall L. Ross II, Denying Deference: Civil Rights and Judicial Resistance to
Administrative Constitutionalism, 2014 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 223, 278–83 (describing the Supreme
Court’s denial of deference to agency interpretations to groups claiming protection under civil
rights statutes).
149. See id. at 268–82.
150. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 243–44 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (describing as “an absolute classic case for deference to
agency interpretation” one in which the Court denied deference to an EEOC interpretation of
the ADEA).
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Fourteenth Amendment provides the best analogy to its denial of
deference to agency interpretations of civil rights statutes. Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment grants to Congress the authority to
enforce the substantive provisions of the amendment, which include
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, through appropriate
legislation.151
For three decades, the Court broadly deferred to congressional
exercises of authority under Section 5, subjecting legislation passed
pursuant to this authority to a lenient form of review.152 Applying this
lenient form of review, the Court did not strike down a single law as
exceeding congressional Section 5 authority.153 Beginning in the mid1990s, however, the Court shifted course and applied more rigorous
scrutiny, ruling civil rights laws protective of religious minorities, the
aged, and the disabled to be invalid exercises of authority under
Section 5.154
Separation of powers was one of the justifications for the Court’s
invalidation of civil rights statutes as exceeding congressional authority
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.155 In City of Boerne v.

151. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
152. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966) (finding that Congress has the
same broad power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as it has under the Necessary
and Proper Clause and applying a standard to broadly deferential to congressional exercises of
power under Section 5).
153. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five
Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1954–
59 (2003) (describing the Court’s application of a deferential standard to congressional exercises
of Section 5 power from the 1960s to the 1990s).
154. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (finding that Title I
of the Americans with Disability Act exceeded congressional enforcement authority under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000)
(finding that the ADEA exceeded congressional enforcement authority under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (striking down the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) as exceeding congressional authority under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment) .
155. Federalism is another justification for the new limits on congressional exercises of
authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment with protecting state sovereign
immunity emerging as a primary concern in this jurisprudence. The Court has held that when
Congress validly exercises power pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, it can
authorize private suits for money damages against the state. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.
445, 456 (1976) (“[W]e think that the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty
which it embodies, . . . are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”). The Court’s rigorous scrutiny and invalidation of congressional
exercises of power under the Fourteenth Amendment can be explained by the desire to narrow
congressional authority to abrogate sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363–64
(recognizing congressional authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to Section 5
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Flores,156 the first case to establish separation-of-powers limits on
congressional authority to define the Constitution, the Court
announced that its interpretations of the Constitution are supreme and
that Congress owes deference to them.157 Neither Congress nor the
executive had the authority to substantively redefine what the
Constitution means.158
In City of Boerne and subsequent cases, the Court relied on
findings that civil rights statutes substantively redefine equal
protection or due process to support invalidations of congressional
exercises of authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.159 The Court, however, has thus far avoided the crucial
question of what it means for another branch of government to
substantively redefine the Constitution. For vague and ambiguous
constitutional provisions that are the usual subjects of constitutional
controversy, judicial determinations about constitutional meaning
typically involve a two-step process.160 First, the Court identifies the
legislation and proceeding to closely scrutinize Congress’s exercise of power under this provision).
But most civil rights statutes—including the ESEA, the Civil Rights Act, the ADEA, and the
ADA—have been passed exclusively, or in part, on the basis of congressional authority under
Article I of the Constitution. Since Congress cannot abrogate sovereign immunity when
exercising power pursuant to Article I of the Constitution, congressional adoption and
administrative enforcement of these civil rights statutes do not raise the same federalism concerns.
See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72–73 (1996) (“The Eleventh Amendment restricts
the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional
limitation placed upon federal jurisdiction.”).
156. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
157. See id. at 536 (“When the Court has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within the
province of the Judicial Branch, which embraces the duty to say what the law is.”); see also Robert
F. Nagel, Judicial Supremacy and the Settlement Function, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 349, 349–50
(1998) (describing the judicial supremacy principle underlying the City of Boerne decision).
158. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529 (“If Congress could define its own powers by altering
the Fourteenth Amendment’s meaning, no longer would the Constitution be ‘superior paramount
law, unchangeable by ordinary means.’” (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803))).
159. See id. at 534 (finding on the basis of the record that RFRA’s curtailment of the state’s
general regulatory power “far exceed[s] any pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct under
the Free Exercise Clause as interpreted [by the Court] in Smith”).
160. See Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2004)
(separating the two phases of judicial constitutional decisionmaking between constructing
“constitutional operative propositions,” which are the “judiciary’s understanding of the proper
meaning of a constitutional power, right, duty, or other sort of provision” and establishing
“constitutional decision rules,” which are “doctrines that direct courts how to decide whether a
constitutional operative proposition is satisfied.”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court,
1996 Term—Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 61–67 (1997)
(distinguishing between the Court’s role in interpreting and implementing the Constitution);
Bertrall L. Ross II, Embracing Administrative Constitutionalism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 519, 539–542
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broad principle that underlies the constitutional text.161 Second, the
Court develops the rule or standard to apply the constitutional
principle to specific controversies.162 The statutes that Congress enacts
and the interpretations of statutes that agencies proffer typically do not
deviate from the constitutional principles that the Court has
embraced.163 But differences arise between the rules or standards that
the Court, on the one hand, and Congress and agencies, on the other
hand, adopt to implement the constitutional principles.
For example, the case that gave rise to some of the most recent
assertions of judicial supremacy involved a conflict between two
different rules for implementing the constitutional principle of
religious liberty grounded in the First Amendment’s Free Exercise
Clause. In Employment Division v. Smith,164 the Court held that the
religious liberty principle did not require special religious exemptions
from general legal prohibitions.165 In the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA), Congress rejected the Smith rule and
advanced a different rule prohibiting state actors from substantially
burdening a person’s free exercise of religion even through a generally
applicable law.166 The Court in City of Boerne struck down RFRA in

(2014) (identifying a framework for constitutional decisionmaking that involves the interpretation
of text, elaboration of principle, and application of that principle).
161. See Ross, supra note 160, at 540–41 (describing the court’s role in deriving principles
from text).
162. Id. at 541–42 (describing the court’s role in applying principles through the development
of rules and standards).
163. For example, both the Court in its interpretation of the First Amendment in Employment
Division v. Smith and Congress in its contrary interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause in the
RFRA both agree that the principle of religious liberty underlies the Free Exercise Clause.
Compare Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(1) (2012) (“The
framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of religion as an unalienable right, secured
its protection in the First Amendment to the Constitution.”), with Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 877 (1990) (“The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe and
profess whatever religions doctrine one desires.”).
164. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
165. Id. at 878–79 (1990) (“We have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse
him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to
regulate.”).
166. According to RFRA, “Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, [unless the government can
demonstrate] that application of the burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)–(b).
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part because Congress had violated the principle of judicial supremacy
by enacting a statute that substantively redefined the Constitution.167
In interpretations and enforcements of the Fourteenth
Amendment, there appears to be broad agreement between the Court,
Congress, and agencies that the Equal Protection Clause advances an
antidiscrimination principle broadly defined.168 But there is
considerable disagreement on the standards and rules for
implementing this principle. Due to this disagreement, Congress and
agencies have diverged from the Court in determinations about which
classes are entitled to heightened protection from disparately harmful
laws. As I detailed in Part I, the Court has determined that the poor,
the elderly, and the disabled are entitled to neither heightened
protection from laws that discriminate against them nor any special
accommodation.169 But Congress through statutes such as the ESEA,
Civil Rights Act, ADA, and ADEA and agencies through
interpretations of these statutes have provided heightened protections
and special accommodations to these groups.170
Judicial supremacy would seem to demand judicial invalidation of
these congressional and agency Constitution-based determinations
because they deviate from those of the Court. But unlike the religious
liberty rules, the difference between the equal protection
determinations about which classes are entitled to protection and how
much protection they are entitled to has not been based on a
substantive disagreement between the political branches and the Court
about what the Constitution substantively requires. The Court applies
deferential rational basis review to laws that discriminate against the
poor, the elderly, and the disabled not because the Constitution
substantively requires that form of review. Rather, judicial
considerations about the appropriate role for itself as an unelected,
unaccountable institution in a democracy demand judicial
167. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997) (finding that Congress through RFRA
attempted “a substantive change in constitutional protections”).
168. Both Congress in civil rights statutes and the Court in its constitutional jurisprudence
have been focused on prohibiting unjustified discrimination against persons. Compare Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2012) (“It is . . . the purpose of this
chapter . . . to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment”), and Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (describing the purpose of the statute “to address the
major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.”), with City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (“The Equal Protection Clause . . . is
essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”).
169. See supra Part I.C.
170. See supra Part II.A.
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noninterference when groups are deemed capable of defending
themselves in the political process.171 This institutional logic suggests
that more democratic institutions—Congress and administrative
agencies—should be given leeway to diverge from the Court’s doctrine
by enforcing equal protection principles in ways that provide
protections to groups left unprotected by the Court. The judicial
presumption of a functional democratic process that underlies the
decision not to intervene to closely scrutinize laws that burden
subordinated minorities should also apply to laws that provide
heightened protection to subordinated minorities.
In sum, the separation-of-powers concern that inspired judicial
limitations on congressional exercises of power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not provide a basis for judicial denial of
deference to agency interpretations of civil rights statutes protective of
suspect classes. This does not mean that courts have no role in
constraining agency interpretations of civil rights statutes. It only
means that those constraints are more appropriately derived from the
limits on agency interpretations established in Chevron and on agency
procedures established in State Farm.172
CONCLUSION
With the election of Donald Trump, it may seem like an odd time
to be making the case for an administrative role in protecting suspect
classes. In the next-to-last day of the Obama administration, for
example, the administration decided to drop the proposed supplementnot-supplant regulation implementing the ESEA,173 perhaps
anticipating that additional protection for poor children would not be
going anywhere in the Trump administration. But it is arguably
precisely the right time to make the case for an administrative role in
protecting suspect classes because the only other institution capable of
taking on this role, the Supreme Court, may be even less willing to
protect suspect classes than it has been of late, given its potential
change in composition.
The simple replacement of one of the liberal Justices during his
term will allow President Trump to shape the Court according to his
171. See supra text accompanying notes 94–101.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 141–43.
173. See Benjamin Wermund, ‘Supplement, not Supplant’ Scrapped, POLITICO (Jan. 19, 2017,
10:00 AM), http://www.politico.com/tipsheets/morning-education/2017/01/supplement-not-supp
lant-scrapped-218300 [https://perma.cc/W889-9FY5].

ROSS IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1846

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

5/8/2017 1:50 PM

[Vol. 66:1807

own ideological preferences even more so than the executive agencies
over which he has direct control. The combination of civil-service
protection for agency line workers who tend to be most committed to
the mission, along with the unwieldy nature of the administrative state
makes presidential control fleeting and difficult. Thus, in the absence
of social movements or political mobilization that might transform
historically subordinated and politically marginalized classes into
politically powerful groups, administrative agencies will be even more
critical to the protection of suspect classes. Although it might be too
optimistic to suggest that Trump administration agencies will be
particularly active in protecting suspect classes, they may be able to
hold the line until a new administration more interested in protecting
civil rights comes into power. Until then, it is critical to lay the doctrinal
and normative groundwork for a continued administrative role in
protecting suspect classes.

